Because “credit adventurism” was the prime cause of the 2008 crash, its effects were concentrated in the credit (banking) system. But GFC II, resulting instead from “monetary adventurism”, will this time put the monetarysystem at risk, hazarding the viability of fiat currencies.
In addition to mass defaults, and collapses in asset prices, we should anticipate that currency crises, accompanied by breakdowns of trust in currencies, will be at the centre of GFC II. The take-off of inflation should be considered likely, not least because no other process exists for the destruction of the real value of gargantuan levels of debt.
Finally on this topic, it should be noted that policies used in response to 2008 will not work in the context of GFC II. Monetary policy can be used to combat debt excesses, but problems of monetary credibility cannot, by definition, be countered by increasing the quantity of money. Estimates based on SEEDS suggest that GFC II will be at least four orders of magnitude larger than GFC I.
Now that central banks have pretty much exhausted conventional methods of monetary policy, do you think they’ll eventually resort to more aggressive policies in order to kick the can down the road after the next deflationary recession hits? And what will the long-term implications be for fiat currencies?
Will we actually get to see “helicopter money”?
Helicopter money is a proposed unconventional monetary policy, sometimes suggested as an alternative to quantitative easing (QE) when the economy is in a liquidity trap (when interest rates near zero and the economy remains in recession). Although the original idea of helicopter money describes central banks making payments directly to individuals, economists have used the term ‘helicopter money’ to refer to a wide range of different policy ideas, including the ‘permanent’ monetization of budget deficits – with the additional element of attempting to shock beliefs about future inflation or nominal GDP growth, in order to change expectations.